## **EXHIBIT Y**

### EXHIBIT 3

# REDACTED VERSION BROWN DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE

	Page 857
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN JOSE DIVISION
3	
4	IN RE: HIGH-TECH EMPLOYEE No. 11-CV-2509-LHK
5	ANTITRUST LITIGATION
6	
7	
8	CONFIDENTIAL PORTIONS DESIGNATED
9	
10	Continued Videotaped Deposition of EDWARD E.
11	LEAMER, PH.D., Volume 3, taken at the offices
12	of O'Melvey & Myers LLP, Two Embarcadero Center,
13	Suite 2800, San Francisco, California commencing
14	at 9:03 a.m., on Monday, November 18, 2013,
15	before Leslie Rockwood, RPR, CSR No. 3462.
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22	
23	
24	JOB No. 1765129
25	PAGES 857 - 1169

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1	Q. In fact, you relied on the Complaint in this	
2	case for your report?	
3	A. Yes, I did.	
4	MR. RILEY: Let's have this marked as	
5	Exhibit 105.	09:11:09
6	(Exhibit 105, color diagram, marked for	
7	identification.)	
8	Q. BY MR. RILEY: Exhibit 105 is a diagram that is	
9	taken from the Consolidated Amended Complaint, paragraph	
10	108.	09:11:37
11	Now reviewing this diagram, Dr. Leamer, is there	
12	any evidence at all that Adobe did not compete during the	
13	conduct period with Intuit, Google, Intel, Pixar, and	
14	Lucasfilm?	
15	A. Well, I'm not sure this document is speaks to	09:11:58
16	the question that you made a reference to. This document	
17	speaks to the illegal agreements. It doesn't say	
18	anything about the extent to which one firm competes with	
19	the other, the extent that Adobe might be hiring from	
20	Intel or Intuit, for example. That simply is not	09:12:16
21	relevant.	
22	Q. Right. The fact of competition is not relevant?	
23	A. This document is a description of the illegal	
24	agreements, and it says nothing about whether Adobe,	
25	absent or with the agreements, was competing for	09:12:30

		Page 873
1	employees directly with Intel or Intuit. It merely is an	
2	image that describes the agreements. It doesn't describe	
3	competition, and you're asking me to interpret it as if	
4	it described competition, but it was never intended to do	
5	that.	09:12:47
6	Q. I'm just directing your attention to Adobe as	
7	shown on this chart. Are you aware of any evidence that	
8	during the conduct period or let me rephrase that.	
9	Are you aware of any evidence before, during, or	
10	after the conduct period that Adobe did not compete with	09:12:59
11	Intuit for employees?	
12	A. As I sit here today, I'm not aware of any	
13	specific evidence that would indicate that. There is	
14	a there are payroll records, of course, which we have,	
15	and we can tell who Adobe hired from in the periods in	09:13:20
16	which the agreements were in place. So it would be	
17	fairly easy to determine which of these defendants, if	
18	any, Adobe hired from.	
19	Q. Did you do that work	
20	A. But in terms of who they compete with, that's a	09:13:32
21	rather broad and ambiguous question. And the mere fact	
22	that they didn't hire from Intuit doesn't mean that they	
23	were or were not competing in the same market frame with	
24	Intuit.	
25	Q. Are you aware of any evidence in this case that	09:13:46

		Page 874
1	before, during, or after the conduct period Adobe was not	
2	competing with Google for employees?	
3	A. Well, are you asking me whether they compete	
4	whether they're hiring directly or whether they're hiring	
5	in the same market that the Google employees happen to be	09:14:05
6	in? So are you asking me whether they are cold-calling	
7	or directly approaching Google employees, or the more	
8	general question, are they hiring, say, software	
9	engineers, all of whom are hired by all of these	
10	companies?	09:14:24
11	Q. I'm using the word "competing" in the same way	
12	that you used it in paragraph 82 of your report. You	
13	said, "Documents reveal that the defendants would	
14	otherwise have been competing for employees."	
15	Do you see that?	09:14:35
16	A. I do see that.	
17	Q. Okay. So my question is: Do you have are	
18	you aware of any evidence that during that before,	
19	during, or after the conduct period, that Adobe was not	
20	competing with Google for employees?	09:14:48
21	A. Well, I think the better way of saying it is	
22	that a channel between Adobe and Google has been closed	
23	down by the illegal agreements, and it's through that	
24	channel that Adobe historically would have been competing	
25	for the employees at Google.	09:15:16

		Page 875
1	Q. On Exhibit 105, can you direct my attention to	
2	the channel between Adobe and Google that has been shut	
3	down?	
4	A. Adobe had an agreement with Apple, and Apple had	
5	an agreement with Google.	09:15:26
6	Q. But Adobe is free to compete directly for Google	
7	employees; correct?	
8	A. But again, you're having a rather limited notion	
9	of how a market operates, and I'm thinking that the	
10	competition for these workers between Adobe and Google is	09:15:43
11	attenuated as a consequence of this chain of illegal	
12	agreements.	
13	Q. Adobe is free to under this arrangement shown	
14	in Exhibit 105, Adobe is free to cold-call, recruit, and	
15	hire employees from Google; correct?	09:16:01
16	A. That's correct.	
17	Q. And Adobe is also free to cold-call, hire, and	
18	recruit employees from Intel; correct?	
19	A. That's correct.	
20	Q. And Adobe is free to cold-call, hire, and	09:16:14
21	recruit employees from Pixar under this arrangement?	
22	A. That's correct.	
23	Q. And Adobe is free to cold-call, recruit, and	
24	hire employees in Lucasfilm under this agreement?	
25	A. That's correct.	09:16:27


		Page 876
1	Q. So the only company that Adobe is restricted	
2	from hiring from cold-calling from is Apple; correct?	
3	A. That's correct.	
4	Q. Now, in fact, during the conduct period, the	
5	defendants who had cold-call agreements continued to	09:16:46
6	compete with employees in other ways; correct?	
7	A. They had other channels, recruiting channels, in	
8	operation that were allowed by the agreements. I have	
9	not studied the extent to which that recruiting was	
10	actually occurring.	09:17:02
11	Q. Why didn't you study that?	
12	A. Because I was studying the impact of the	
13	cold-calling agreements.	
14	Q. Wouldn't that be relevant to impact to	
15	understand what channels were otherwise available?	09:17:13
16	A. Well, you really want to know whether those	
17	channels were in some ways substitute for the	
18	cold-calling that was prevented, and the data sets did	
19	not allow me to do that.	
20	The recruiting data is very weak, and I continue	09:17:26
21	to argue, as you've heard in the past, that the	
22	cold-calling is a special channel that approaches special	
23	employees providing special information that isn't	
24	provided by the other methods of recruiting.	
25	Q. What special information is available through	09:17:42

		Page 952
1	older employees?	
2	A. Well, the calculated damages will have that	
3	feature. That's for sure.	
4	Q. Okay.	
5	A. But I want to make a couple of comments, which	11:13:38
6	is that this age variable doesn't have a big impact on	
7	the firm total damages. And secondly, the the	
8	the this talks about percentage impact, not absent	
9	impact. So the percentage of the younger workers are off	
10	a lower base. So you'd better take a look at the absent	11:14:02
11	impact, not just the percentage.	
12	And then finally, the idea that is the 25,	
13	30-years-olds who are going to be the where the	
14	cold-calling is concentrated, that seems sensible to me.	
15	Q. But in your model, the 20-year-old, who is	11:14:19
16	unlikely to get cold-calls, is has a proportionality	
17	greater impact than the 28-year-old, who is likely to get	
18	cold-calls?	
19	A. That's the attempt of the model which is a	
20	quadratic form trying to fit something that may not have	11:14:38
21	that shape.	
22	Q. So how can this possibly make sense given your	
23	opinion that younger employers are less likely to be	
24	cold-called, but your model demonstrates that those	
25	younger employees suffer a greater injury from not being	11:14:53

		Page 953
1	cold-called? How does that make sense, Dr. Leamer?	
2	A. Well, I think that's a little distortion. My	
3	goal was not to estimate the age profile of impact. I	
4	was never asked to do that. I was meant I was asked	
5	to estimate the total impact. And I recognize that age	11:15:11
6	might be a consideration, that the age distribution of	
7	these firms as they vary over time and as they vary one	
8	to another might have had an impact on the total damages.	
9	And thus I attempted to deal with that by the age and age	
10	squared, which are the normal variables that economists	11:15:30
11	use for describing the age distribution of wages and	
12	presumably impact as well.	
13	Q. But	
14	A. And then when I get this anomaly, which worries	
15	me too, the fact that the youngest workers have the	11:15:44
16	largest impact, the question is, is that a material	
17	consideration. It's not surprising to me that the	
18	that the that the 30-year-olds, who are still mobile,	
19	they could easily be where the cold-calling has the	
20	biggest impact, and you get to be 40-year-olds, maybe	11:16:04
21	you're more cemented and locationally committed. And so	
22	it's seems reasonable.	
23	I think it's inappropriate to think that the	
24	very youngest workers are going to have the most impact	
25	of the cold-call.	11:16:24

		Page 954
1	Q. But that's what your model produces.	
2	A. Well, my model produces an estimate of the	
3	damages. I didn't build a model that was intended to	
4	disaggregate individual-by-individual. So this is an	
5	attempt to control for the differences in the age	11:16:37
6	distributions across firms, and when you when you do	
7	this, it doesn't have a big impact on the on the	
8	damages.	
9	Q. But you continue to maintain and use the age	
10	conduct variables in your calculation of damages;	11:16:52
11	correct?	
12	A. Well, this is the data most among the	
13	functional forms that we estimated, this is the one that	
14	the data likes the most. So if my job were to determine	
15	the age profile of impact, I would have taken another	11:17:07
16	step. But in terms of controlling for the differences	
17	among firms and the differences over time as firms hire	
18	or as their workforce changes, this seems to me to be an	
19	adequate calculation.	
20	It's inappropriate if my task were to determine	11:17:25
21	the age profile of damages. It's completely appropriate	
22	if my task is to correct for differences in age	
23	composition of the workforces of these seven defendants.	
24	Q. But your result is inconsistent with your theory	
25	about who is most likely to be cold-called. Doesn't that	11:17:45

		Page 955
1	give you pause? Doesn't that give you concern?	
2	MR. GLACKIN: Object to the form.	
3	THE WITNESS: Well, again, I answered that,	
4	which is that that I was not asked to estimate the age	
5	profile of impact. I was asked to compute total damages.	11:17:58
6	And my goal was to control for the differences in these	
7	firms in terms of age composition. And this is the way	
8	that I've carried that out. Now and this turns out not	
9	to matter very much.	
10	Q. BY MR. RILEY: Because it doesn't have much	11:18:17
11	impact on damages, it doesn't matter?	
12	A. That's correct.	
13	Q. I want to go through another example with you.	
14	MR. RILEY: Let's have this marked as the next.	
15	(Exhibit 109 (Confidential), Names Plaintiff	11:19:29
16	Siddharth Hariharan Actual and But-For	
17	Compensation and Alledged Damages, marked for	
18	identification.)	
19	Q. BY MR. RILEY: Dr. Leamer, in Exhibit 109 we are	
20	looking at	11:19:39
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		11:20:04



		Page 957
1	number that I'm looking at here.	
2	Q. Right. But based on this description, we're	
3	following your model correctly; is that right?	
4	MR. GLACKIN: Object to the form.	
5	THE WITNESS: Well, you're misusing my model for	11:21:59
6	the reasons I already indicated.	
7	Q. BY MR. RILEY: How are we misusing it?	
8	A. Because I said before that my intent was not to	
9	produce an estimate of damages person-by-person,	
10	age-by-age. I wanted to estimate the collective damages	11:22:13
11	for each firm in every year.	
12	Q. So your model cannot be correctly applied to	
13	determine the alleged damages for any individual?	
14	A. That's correct. I think that I would use it in	
15	a different way. I would certainly be aware if you're	11:22:23
16	asking me to create a wage profile, an age profile of	
17	damages, I would certainly have done this exercise in a	
18	somewhat different way.	
19	Q. How would you have done it if you were asked to	
20	compute damages for individuals?	11:22:41
21	MR. GLACKIN: Object to the form.	
22	THE WITNESS: Well, I would look at the	
23	distribution exactly. In fact, I did. I looked at that	
24	curve, and it bothered me that it had that shape because	
25	it wasn't consistent with my understanding of the impacts	11:22:52

		Page 958
1	of the agreements. But the question isn't whether that's	
2	the wrong shape. The question is whether is this	
3	adequate to adjust for the different age compositions of	
4	the different employers, and my view is yes.	
5	I never intended this ever to be used in the way	11:23:11
6	that you're going down here.	
7	Q. BY MR. RILEY: You never intended your model to	
8	be used to compute damages for individual class members?	
9	A. For individuals. It's for damages firm-by-year.	
10	And the reason I use the individual data is because I	11:23:22
11	thought it was a more appropriate data source for	
12	estimating firm-by-year damages, not because I wanted to	
13	offer an expert opinion about each individual's damages.	
14	Q. So let's take a look at the second page. And	
15	what we've done here and I realize you believe this is	11:23:42
16	inappropriate to determine individual damages,	
17		
18		
19		
20		11:24:01
21		
22		
23		
24	How does that make any sense?	
25	MR. GLACKIN: Object to the form.	11:24:17

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1	which means those wild estimates could be much bigger or	
2	much smaller.	
3	Q. BY MR. RILEY: Right. But you would agree that	
4	statistical significance is an important characteristic	
5	of a reliable model?	13:55:51
6	MR. GLACKIN: Object to the form.	
7	THE WITNESS: I'm not sure I would agree with	
8	that. I think that you'd have to tell me what the	
9	alternative model is and why this model that produced	
10	less statistical significance might be a better model or	13:56:08
11	a worse model.	
12	I don't know is the answer. I think it's a	
13	common practice among economists to look for models that	
14	have statistical significance, but as you know from my	
15	report, I've argued that that is a mistaken notion when	13:56:23
16	it comes to the pursuit that I followed, which is trying	
17	to find the best possible estimate. And if that happens	
18	to have a large standard error and is still the best	
19	estimate, you're going to have to live with what is	
20	provided.	13:56:41
21	Q. BY MR. RILEY: So even though the model has	
22	lacks statistical significance on key variables, you have	
23	to live with the result if that's all you have?	
24	MR. GLACKIN: Object to the form.	
25	THE WITNESS: Well, this is going to get us into	13:56:53

		Page 1035
1	a discussion of econometric methodology, but the data	
2	don't speak by themselves in econometric exercises.	
3	They're too weak and too colinear. So the practice of	
4	analyzing data sets is a kind of interactive process	
5	between the analyst and the data.	13:57:15
6	So the analyst is constantly making judgments as	
7	to is this the wrong sign, is this too big, too small,	
8	maybe we'd better get rid of that variable. And that	
9	process which has no foundation in statistical theory	
10	invalidates all the traditional notions of T values and	13:57:31
11	estimates, but it's still something that is commonly	
12	practiced among economists because they feel like there	
13	is such a sea of alternative models out there, they feel	
14	compelled to try to search for one that is the is the	
15	best way of characterizing the data and evidence. And	13:57:52
16	that's what I've done. Statistical significance plays	
17	some role in that, but it's not the only thing.	
18	Q. BY MR. RILEY: In fact, you have reported and	
19	relied on statistical significance throughout this case	
20	in your common factors analysis, for example?	13:58:02
21	A. Well, I have referred to statistical	
22	significance. I'm not so sure I relied on that.	
23	Q. You reported the statistical significance of the	
24	variables that you used; correct?	
25	A. I do that routinely. Regression analysis	13:58:17

		Page 1036
1	reports those things routinely. That would be a	
2	requirement for a scientific study. You would absolutely	
3	have to report that standard error.	
4	The question that you raise, is there some	
5	minimal level of standard error that means that that	13:58:29
6	variable shouldn't belong in there or that that model	
7	isn't a good model. And I'm not so sure I agree with	
8	what you said on that.	
9	Q. You also reported the statistical significance	
10	of the various compensation models you tested; correct?	13:58:43
11	A. Are you talking about regression?	
12	Q. Yes.	
13	A. The regression printout will always and always	
14	should include the standard error of the coefficient so	
15	it gives a sense of the range of possibilities. What	13:58:53
16	you're calling the statistical significance is really a	
17	reference to T value or sometimes called a P value, or	
18	alternative would be a P value. And that's another way	
19	of characterizing how much uncertainty there is in that	
20	particular coefficient.	13:59:09
21	So you need estimates and you need measures of	
22	uncertainty. And you absolutely have to report those in	
23	every regression that you estimate. And you're happier	
24	when the statistical uncertainty is small.	
25	Q. And the P values represent the probability that	13:59:21

		Page 1037
1	the result of a particular coefficient was simply random	
2	error; correct?	
3	A. Was simply random error. Meaning that if the	
4	coefficient was zero, what is the chance of generating	
5	this kind of outcome.	13:59:43
6	Q. Right. So setting the coefficient to zero is	
7	the null hypothesis; correct?	
8	A. That is a null hypothesis, and that is not the	
9	appropriate null hypothesis in this case.	
10	Q. What is the appropriate null hypothesis in this	13:59:58
11	case?	
12	A. If you mean by null hypothesis zero damages,	
13	that seems to me to have been decided upon by all the	
14	textural and testimony and documents. And the question	
15	isn't whether there's zero damages; the question is how	14:00:16
16	large they are.	
17	So I would suggest that Google's decision to do	
18	an across-the-board 10 percent increase in compensation	
19	in their big bang, that's the natural null hypothesis.	
20	The question is would these other firms but for	14:00:31
21	the agreements have adopted as aggressive a stance as	
22	Google did in 2011. And so then instead of testing zero,	
23	you could test the 10-percent level. And frankly, the	
24	estimates that I have are compatible with 10 percent.	
25	But rather than adopting a prejudice in favor of	14:00:51

		Page 1038
1	the larger number, the 10-percent number, or a prejudice	Page 1036
2	in favor of the smaller number, zero, I say let the data	
3	speak. Let the data tell us the best estimate, and	
4	that's what I provided.	
5	Q. So let's go to your Exhibit Number 2 of your	14:01:07
6	October 28th report.	
7	A. What page are we on here?	
8	Q. That's at the very end of your report, and	
9	there's no page number on it.	
10	A. Oh, the okay.	14:01:29
11	Q. You have notes and you have three asterisks,	
12	significant at 1-percent level, two asterisks,	
13	significant at 5-percent level, one asterisk, significant	
14	at the 10-percent level.	
15	Do you see that?	14:01:43
16	A. I do see that.	
17	Q. And that computation of statistical significance	
18	was done setting the null hypothesis to zero?	
19	A. That's correct.	
20	Q. So when you were reporting statistical	14:01:53
21	significance, you didn't use this big bang theory. You	
22	used what most statisticians would consider the	
23	appropriate null hypothesis, which is zero for these	
24	coefficients?	
25	A. Well, most statisticians don't really think	14:02:09

		Page 1039
1	about what the appropriate null is. If you want to read	
2	a good book, you should read Deirdre McCloskey's book	
3	called "The Cult of Statistical Significance," arguing	
4	how economists have misused this concept of statistical	
5	significance.	14:02:22
6	This is just a printout from a regression. Just	
7	a printout from regression. This is not a description of	
8	my thought process.	
9	MR. RILEY: Let me move to strike that.	
10	Q. So when you were reporting statistical	14:02:31
11	significance in your notes in this document which you	
12	prepared for use in this case for the Federal Court, you	
13	used zero as the null hypothesis for these coefficients;	
14	correct?	
15	MR. GLACKIN: Object to the form.	14:02:51
16	THE WITNESS: Well, again, I hope you don't	
17	think that was a choice. That's just a standard	
18	operating procedure that economists use. When it comes	
19	to estimating the damages, I'm trying to argue that that	
20	is a poor idea.	14:03:05
21	Q. BY MR. RILEY: I'm asking what you actually used	
22	in Exhibit 2.	
23	A. Well, Exhibit 2 is just a printout of	
24	regression, a standard printout of regression. It's just	
25	a dump of regression data.	14:03:15

		Page 1040
1	The question is am I allowed to use wisdom in	
2	interpreting all this stuff rather than just mechanical	
3	reference to statistical significance.	
4	Q. When you reported statistical significance to	
5	the U.S. District Court, you used zero as the null	14:03:29
6	hypothesis; correct?	
7	MR. GLACKIN: Object to the form.	
8	THE WITNESS: Just because that's the way that	
9	it's usually done in econometric literature, but I	
10	reserve the right to give an argument as to why that is	14:03:41
11	misleading in this case. It can be appropriate when the	
12	null hypothesis is the right null, when zero is the right	
13	null. But when the zero is not the right null, then the	
14	statistical significance isn't material, and it	
15	particularly isn't material when there's no presumption	14:03:59
16	of a zero impact.	
17	Q. BY MR. RILEY: In the estimates for the conduct	
18	variable at four, which you represent is significant at	
19	the 1-percent level.	
20	Do you see that, Dr. Leamer?	14:04:17
21	A. Yes.	
22	Q. And that determination of significance at the	
23	1-percent level is calculated using the standard error	
24	and the T value to compute a P value which gave you	
25	significance at the 1-percent level; correct?	14:04:33

		Page 1041
1	A. Correct, but you should realize that Exhibit 3	
2	has the corrected standard errors per Dr. Murphy.	
3	Q. We're going to get to Exhibit 3. I'm just	
4	focusing on Exhibit 2.	
5	A. So, anyways, I'm not relying on these numbers at	14:04:46
6	all. This is understating the uncertainty and	
7	overstating the statistical significance, overestimating	
8	the T values.	
9	Q. You said these numbers are understating the	
10	certainty?	14:05:03
11	MR. GLACKIN: Understating the uncertainty.	
12	MR. RILEY: I don't know what he said.	
13	THE WITNESS: The standard errors are	
14	underestimating. The T values are overestimated.	
15	Q. BY MR. RILEY: Why is that?	14:05:12
16	A. Because of the internal correlation structure	
17	among the many among the 277,000 workers in this data	
18	set.	
19	Q. Right. So what that means is your observations,	
20	the 277,119, are not strictly independent observations?	14:05:24
21	A. Correct.	
22	Q. And because because of that, your computation	
23	of the standard error is too high?	
24	A. No, the standard error is too low.	
25	Q. Too low?	14:05:43

		Page 1042
1	A. The T stat is too high.	
2	Q. Right. And that's because in the in the	
3	standard error, the denominator relates to the square	
4	root of the observations?	
5	A. More or less, that's what it is, yeah.	14:06:05
6	Effective number of the observations.	
7	Q. So you decided that in light of Professor	
8	Murphy's criticism, you needed to correct these standar	cd
9	error numbers; correct?	
10	A. Yeah, I thought he had a legitimate comment th	nat 14:06:18
11	standard errors were underestimated.	
12	Q. And that's what you did in Exhibit 3; correct	?
13	A. Yeah, and this is his treatment for the proble	em,
14	which is what I did in Exhibit 3.	
15	Q. And Exhibit 3 shows robust standard errors;	14:06:32
16	correct?	
17	A. Does it say robust?	
18	Q. Look at Column 2 in the	
19	A. Oh, yes.	
20	Q exhibit that you prepared.	14:06:46
21	A. Yes.	
22	Q. You have "robust."	
23	A. Correct.	
24	Q. And by "robust," you mean these are clustered	
25	standard errors; right?	14:06:53

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1	A. Well, I mean the word "robust" should be used	
2	to insensitive to changes in the model. But these are	
3	meant to be asymptotically robust, meaning as you get an	
4	infinite data set, these will work fine. But whether	
5	they are robust in a finance sample is very much doubtful	14:07:13
6	in my mind.	
7	Q. So you shouldn't have used the word "robust" if	
8	you had doubt about this data set; right?	
9	A. Again, I used the word "significant." In	
10	everyday common language, the word "significant" means	14:07:25
11	important.	
12	Q. I'm not asking about significant. I'm asking	
13	about robust.	
14	MR. GLACKIN: Let him finish his answer.	
15	THE WITNESS: I'm burdened by the language that	14:07:34
16	economists have, and they overuse the word "significant,"	
17	and they start to think that "significant" is the same as	
18	important. It isn't. It's about measurability.	
19	The same thing is true with this word "robust."	
20	To use that to refer to these standard errors, that's not	14:07:49
21	my word here. I didn't make that word up. That's what	
22	they're using for describing this procedure, and I just	
23	adopted that language as a way of communicating what was	
24	done.	
25	But I'm expressing doubt about the	14:07:59

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1	appropriateness of the language in both cases. "Robust"	
2	is misleading, and "significant" is misleading as well.	
3	Q. BY MR. RILEY: So under the column that says	
4	"robust standard error," those values are the result of	
5	clustering the standard errors?	14:08:12
6	A. Correct.	
7	Q. And what this produces is two of the variables,	
8	the conduct interacted with the new hires and the general	
9	conduct variable are not statistically significant;	
10	correct?	14:08:33
11	A. That's correct.	
12	Q. And isn't it true that that conduct variable,	
13	which is not statistically significant, is responsible	
14	for the greatest share of the damages that you calculate	
15	for the defendants?	14:08:48
16	A. That coefficient minus .0559 is the critical	
17	coefficient, that's correct.	
18	Q. Right. So now in your model, the critical	
19	coefficient responsible for the greatest measure of	
20	damages doesn't have statistical significance; right?	14:08:59
21	A. It has a large standard error. Let's use that	
22	word. And what a large standard error means is that the	
23	estimate is 5.6 percent and the standard error is .04.	
24	So that's that says that, in fact, the data are	
25	compatible with a 9-percent impact or compatible with a	14:09:17

		Page 1045
1	1-percent impact. The best impact the best estimate	
2	is the 5.6 percent. So it's symmetric with regard to up	
3	and down. It's no it's no tendency for it to be	
4	smaller. The standard error says it could be larger; it	
5	could be smaller.	14:09:37
6	Q. The null hypothesis for variable four would be	
7	zero; correct?	
8	A. No, I said a sensible null hypothesis is .1.	
9	That's the Intel. So rather than imagining that there	
10	might be no impact of the conspiracy, let's use Intel's	14:09:52
11	choice in a post-conspiracy world of a 10 percent across	
12	the board impact and see whether we can accept or reject	
13	whether that coefficient is big as .1. And the answer is	
14	you can't reject that.	
15	So .1 is equally compatible with this data set	14:10:09
16	as is one as is zero. I'm sorry.	
17	Q. The notes in here compute significance based on	
18	a null hypothesis is zero; correct?	
19	A. Well, I'm trying to argue why that is	
20	inappropriate in this setting.	14:10:23
21	Q. But the I want you to assume that that	
22	approach which is reflected in the notes, the null	
23	hypothesis for conduct is zero.	
24	MR. GLACKIN: Object to the form.	
25	Q. BY MR. RILEY: I want you to assume that. What	14:10:36

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1	STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ss:
2	COUNTY OF MARIN )
3	
4	I, LESLIE ROCKWOOD, CSR NO. 3452, do hereby
5	certify:
6	That the foregoing deposition testimony was
7	taken before me at the time and place therein set forth
8	and at which time the witness was administered the oath;
9	That testimony of the witness and all objections
10	made by counsel at the time of the examination were
11	recorded stenographically by me, and were thereafter
12	transcribed under my direction and supervision, and that
13	the foregoing pages contain a full, true and accurate
14	record of all proceedings and testimony to the best of my
15	skill and ability.
16	I further certify that I am neither counsel for
17	any party to said action, nor am I related to any party
18	to said action, nor am I in any way interested in the
19	outcome thereof.
20	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name
21	this 20th day of November, 2013.
22	
23	
24	
25	LESLIE ROCKWOOD, RPR, CSR NO. 3462